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Abstract
We present an integration of a safe C dialect, Checked
C, for the Internet of Things operating system RIOT. We
utilize this integration to convert parts of the RIOT net-
work stack to Checked C, thereby achieving spatial mem-
ory safety in these code parts. Similar to prior research
done on IoT operating systems and safe C dialects, our in-
tegration of Checked C remains entirely optional, i.e. com-
pilation with a standard C compiler not supporting the
Checked C language extension is still possible. We believe
this to be the rst proposed integration of a safe C dialect
for the RIOT operating system. We present an incremental
process for converting RIOT modules to Checked C, eval-
uate the overhead introduced by the conversions, and dis-
cuss our general experience with utilizing Checked C in
the Internet of Things domain.
1 Introduction
RIOT is an operating system explicitly targeting “con-
strained IoT devices” [2, p. 2453]. As such these devices
are programmed in the low-level programming language
C [2, p. 2454] which oers very few safety features.
The result is that errors in programs written in C often
go unnoticed [6, p. 103]. This is especially critical in the
Internet of Things for a variety of reasons. First of all, de-
bugging of constrained IoT devices is dicult [15, p. 1]. If a
bug has been found, debugged and xed an update needs to
be provided. Unfortunately, updating constrained devices
is challenging [16] and at the time of writing RIOT doesn’t
provide any built-in method for doing so [1]. Addition-
ally, some programming errors caused by missing safety
features can be exploited. Buer overows are the stan-
dard example for this [5]. This is even more problematic
on constrained IoT devices where protection mechanisms
such as fault isolation are not available [14, p. 234].
For this reason, it is important to prevent such errors
in the programming language itself. Doing so has been a
longstanding research topic [6, 8, 36, 17]. One of the more
recent research projects in this regard is an extension of the
C programming language called Checked C [20]. In this
paper we will present an integration of the Checked C lan-
guage extension for the RIOT operating system. With this
integration we are hoping to bring spatial memory safety
to the RIOT operating system. To our knowledge, this is
the rst work exploring Checked C in the embedded do-
main. Our integration of Checked C remains entirely op-
tional, thereby allowing utilization of Checked C without
loosing the ability to compile RIOT with a legacy C com-
piler.
2 Background
The following subsections briey introduce the technolo-
gies used in this paper. Related work is also presented.
2.1 Checked C
Checked C is an extension of the C programming language.
It extends the C programming language as standardized by
the ISO [10] (referred to as legacy C in the following text)
with facilities to make writing spatial memory safe C code
possible. Spatial memory safety ensures that “any pointer
dereference is always within the memory allocated to that
pointer” [20, p. 1].
Since it introduces new syntactic keywords, Checked C
code needs to be compiled with a custom compiler based
on LLVM/Clang. It cannot be compiled with a standard
legacy C compiler such as GCC. Nonetheless, it has a
strong focus on backwards compatibility allowing devel-
opers to call legacy C code from Checked C code and vice
versa [20, p. 2]. Additionally, evaluations of the code emit-
ted by the Checked C compiler have shown that the lan-
guage extension introduces a comparably low executable
size of 7.4% on average [20, p. 10]. This makes Checked
C especially well suited for constrained IoT devices where
program memory is often limited [2, p. 2453].
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2.2 RIOT OS
RIOT OS is an open source real-time operating system for
the Internet of Things. It supports constrained IoT devices
with at least 1.5 kB of RAM and 5 kB of ROM. Nonethe-
less, it has features known from conventional operating
systems. For instance, it supports multi-threading and pro-
vides a network stack [2, p. 2454].
Compared to other operating systems for the Internet
of Things, for example Contiki [7] or TinyOS [13], RIOT
is written entirely in standard ISO C [2, p. 2454]. As such,
it is not memory safe and subject to bugs caused by mem-
ory safety violations such as buer overows. Unsurpris-
ingly, out-of-bounds buer accesses have been found in
RIOT and xed in the past [11, 12, 35, 33]. Unfortunately,
the RIOT developers don’t gather these issues in a cen-
tral place. Therefore, it is dicult to generate statistics for
these kinds of bugs.
2.3 Related work
Various attempts have been made in the past to bring mem-
ory safety to dierent operating systems for the Internet
of Things. Cooprider et al. tried to achieve memory safety
by integrating Deputy into the TinyOS ecosystem [4] (re-
ferred to as Safe TinyOS in the following text). A simi-
lar approach, also utilizing Deputy, was implemented by
Dunkels et al. for Contiki [7] (referred to as Safe Contiki
OS in the following text). Especially the former research
lead to some interesting results indicating a ROM overhead
of 13% and a CPU overhead of 5.2% on average [4, p. 2].
To our knowledge no attempts haven been made to
bring similar techniques to the RIOT operating system.
Whether or not this is possible is subject of this paper.
Contrary to the two approaches introduced above we de-
cided to use Checked C instead of Deputy mainly because
the latter is no longer maintained.
3 RIOT-POLICE Overview
RIOT-POLICE is a fork of the RIOT operating system
which includes support for the Checked C language ex-
tension. It was initially based on release 2018.01 of the
RIOT operating system but later updated to the 2018.04
release.
The RIOT source code itself is split into various software
modules. Modules which should be included in an applica-
tion are selected using a variable in the applications Make-
le. The selected modules and the application code itself
are compiled in alphabetic order and linked into a single
freestanding binary. The Checked C toolchain had to be
integrated into this existing build process.
Apart from build system integration, we also had to con-
vert the legacy C code to Checked C. Regarding this pro-
cess our goal was not to convert the entire RIOT code
base since this would (a) be rather time consuming and
(b) our assumption was that some parts of the code base
(e.g. drivers) would not prot as much from memory safety
as others. Since we deemed the network stack to be the
largest attack vector, we decided to focus on that.
Within a few months we managed to convert RIOT mod-
ules for IPv6 [9], UDP [19], CoAP [21] and various util-
ity modules of the network stack to “checked program
scope” [22, pp. 18 sqq.]. Checked C guarantees that no
spatial memory safety violations occur in checked pro-
gram scope [20, p. 4]. Nonetheless, we wanted to con-
tinue using the converted modules from legacy C in order
to convert RIOT modules incrementally. We achieved this
through a Checked C language feature called “bounds-safe
interfaces”. The Checked C compiler inserts “implicit con-
versions between checked types and unchecked types at
bounds-safe interfaces” [22, p. 91], thereby ensuring that
calls to checked functions type check even in legacy C
code.
Additionally, we wanted to make using Checked C en-
tirely optional. This was also an objective of the Safe Con-
tiki OS project [18, p. 170]. Our reasoning behind this was
as follows:
1. RIOT supports platforms not supported by
LLVM/Clang and therefore unsupported by the
Checked C compiler.
2. Some platforms are too constrained for runtime over-
ow checks.
3. RIOT is a large open source project with many con-
tributors. Migrating all developers to a Checked C
toolchain was not deemed feasible.
We achieved optional safety by dening macros for all
new keywords and types introduced by the Checked C lan-
guage extension. These macros fall back to using legacy C
types if the USE_CHECKEDC preprocessor macro is unset.
This allows compilation with a legacy C complier which
doesn’t understand the new keywords and types intro-
duced by the Checked C language extension.
The source code for RIOT-POLICE is available freely
on GitHub https://github.com/beduino-project/
RIOT-POLICE.
4 Evaluation
In the following section we will briey describe the ex-
perience we acquired by integrating Checked C into the
RIOT ecosystem. Furthermore, we are going to evaluate
the choices we made regarding this integration.
4.1 Optional safety through macros
The rst and most important choice we made is that we
wanted to make using Checked C entirely optional. The
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#ifdef USE_CHECKEDC
#define ptr(t) _Ptr<t>
#else
#define ptr(t) t *
#endif
Figure 1: Denition of the macro used to declare a pointer
to a value of a given type.
reason for this were explained in section 3. We considered
two dierent ways of achieving this:
1. Dening macros for new keywords and types, forc-
ing developers to use these when writing Checked C
code.
2. Writing a custom pre-processor for Checked C code
converting it to legacy C code on the y.
We choose the former because previous research by
Paul and Kumar used the same approach for Safe Contiki
OS. We will evaluate this choice further in the following.
Whether the costs of achieving optional safety through
macros were justied will be discussed afterwards. Since
Paul and Kumar used Deputy instead of Checked C they
were able to elide Deputy annotations by dening macros
without arguments for Deputy keywords [18, p. 170]. With
Checked C this wasn’t possible since it introduces both
new types and keywords. New keywords need to be
stripped and checked types need to be mapped to legacy C
types before compilation with a legacy C compiler is possi-
ble. We achieved both by checking the desired target lan-
guage in our macro denitions. As an example consider
the denition of the ptr macro in Figure 1.
The biggest advantage of this macro-based approach is
that it doesn’t require any additional changes to the compi-
lation process. Integrating Checked C into the RIOT build
system thus only required changing a few lines in a single
Makele where the default compiler was set. While this
might seem obvious, it is a huge advantage of Checked C
and shouldn’t be taken for granted. We personally made
the opposite experience while attempting to integrate the
Rust compiler into the RIOT buildsystem [34].
Unfortunately, the macro-based approach also has a
signicant drawback: We weren’t able to utilize the
checked-c-convert program which is a part of the
Checked C toolchain. This tool allows semi-automating
the legacy C to Checked C conversion process since it
“discovers safely-used pointers and rewrites them to be
checked” [20, p. 8]. However, without modications we
wouldn’t have been able to use it even if we had wrote
vanilla Checked C code since it currently doesn’t support
bounds-safe interfaces [28]. The reasons why bounds-safe
interfaces were required are explained in section 3.
It would haven been possible to spend more time on au-
tomating the conversion process by improving this tool.
// Bounds-safe interface for fread(3) in Checked C.
size_t fread(void *p : byte_count(size * nmemb),
size_t size, size_t nmemb,
FILE *stream : itype(ptr<FILE>));
// Bounds-safe interface for fread(3) using our macros.
size_t fread(void *p abyte_count(size * nmemb),
size_t size, size_t nmemb,
FILE *stream atype(ptr(FILE)));
Figure 2: Declarations of the well-known C library func-
tion fread: The rst using Checked C and the
second using our preprocessor macros.
Sadly, we decided against doing so because we drastically
underestimated the amount of work required to convert
the RIOT modules. The reason why this process was so
laborious is that RIOT makes heavy use of pointers. This
is especially true for protocol parsers like the CoAP imple-
mentation. All of these pointers had to be annotated, since
our goal was to convert all modules to “checked program
scope” [22, p. 18]. Converting the network modules them-
selves wasn’t the most laborious process. The most time
was in fact spent writing bound-safe interfaces for utility
modules used by the network modules. This process only
required changes to header les and could have been easily
automated since most of the changes were trivial.
Apart from issues related to the conversion process it-
self, we also noticed that our macros made the source code
less readable. As an example, consider the two bounds-safe
interfaces declared in Figure 2. The rst bounds-safe inter-
face is declared using vanilla Checked C, the latter using
our macros. In order to hide Checked C keywords from a
legacy C compiler we had to encapsulate the colon charac-
ter, used to introduce a Checked C annotation, in the macro
abyte_count. In our experience, this makes it harder to
gure out where the annotation starts on rst sight. How-
ever, readability issues are not only related to our macros
but also to Checked C itself. For instance, bounds-safe in-
terfaces occasionally require types to be declared twice. As
an example consider the annotation for the stream argu-
ment in Figure 2.
It must also be mentioned that our macros might make
it harder for new developers to learn Checked C since they
need to learn both vanilla Checked C and our macros. Ad-
justing code using our macros without a basic understand-
ing of Checked C isn’t possible. For example, a developer
adjusting the denition in Figure 2 must be aware that
the annotation of the stream argument needs to be up-
dated when changing its type. Otherwise compilation will
fail but only when compiling with a Checked C compiler,
which makes it likely that these sort of mistakes will go
unnoticed.
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Module LC (B) CC (B) ES (%)
inet_csum 80 134 68
netapi 266 334 26
netreg 212 370 75
icmpv6_echo 204 314 54
icmpv6 304 516 70
ipv6 1462 1819 24
pkt 16 30 88
pktbuf_static 1126 1530 36
udp 588 776 32
Total 4258 5832 37
Table 1: Executable size benchmark results. LC/CC: Mod-
ule size in bytes when compiled with either a
legacy C or Checked C compiler. ES: Increase of
the executable size in percent.
4.2 Checked C
Apart from issues we had with our macro system we also
discovered a few issues with Checked C itself. The biggest
issue being related to the fact that the compiler is “not
recommended for production use” [3] yet. Especially the
bounds-safe interfaces feature didn’t seem well tested yet.
Over the course of a few months we found eight compiler
bugs [23, 30, 31, 29, 25, 27, 26, 32]. Four of these were
compiler crashes and almost all of them were related to
bounds-safe interfaces. It must, however, also be noted
that all compiler crashes reported by us have been xed
by the Checked C developers since.
Additionally, it occasionally became obvious that op-
tional safety was not a Checked C design goal. For exam-
ple, when converting the CoAP implementation nanocoap
to Checked C we noticed some issues with the checked
pointer type nt_array_ptr. This type ensures that the
array referenced by the pointer is always null-terminated.
This property is achieved by initializing it with a null-
terminator and preventing overwrites of the termina-
tor. However, when compiling with a legacy C compiler
the array usually needs to be explicitly initialized with
a null-terminator, for instance using memset(&ary, 0,
sizeof(ary)). This code won’t compile with a Checked
C compiler since it would overwrite the null-terminator.
This is unfortunate since it makes the conversion process
more complicated. It would be desirable for Checked C to
allow overwriting the existing null-terminator with a new
one [24]. As a workaround we used a preprocessor #ifdef
statement to disable these memset(3) invocations when
compiling with a Checked C compiler.
Furthermore, the executable size overhead we observed
was higher than expected. We evaluated the overhead in
executable size, introduced by the Checked C language ex-
tension, by compiling the RIOT application examples/
nanocoap for the platform pba-d-01-kw2x with- and
without optional safety features. Afterwards, we com-
pared the size of the .text sections of the various ar(1)
archives for modules we converted. The results are shown
in Table 1.
The change in the size of the .text section is dicult
to compare with benchmarks done by the Safe TinyOS and
Checked C developers [4, p. 2, 20, p. 10] due to the fact
that dierent programs were converted for benchmark-
ing. Additionally, some of the modules we converted were
rather small (e.g. pkt) and made heavy use of pointers.
Nonetheless, the total percentage of observed overhead in
executable size seems rather high with 37% in total, es-
pecially compared to the average increase in code size of
7.4% observed by the Checked C Developers [20, p. 10]
or the 5.2% overhead on average achieved by the Safe
TinyOS project [4, p. 2]. The fact that RIOT currently com-
piles all modules without link-time optimisation is a prob-
able cause. Additionally, we didn’t optimize our Checked
C code in a way that would allow the compiler to prove
more bounds-checks to be redundant at compile-time.
The fact that the executable size overhead is rather high
made it even more worthwhile to make the safety features
entirely optional, especially due to the fact that RIOT sup-
ports quite a few platforms with tight limits regarding the
available code size.
5 Conclusion
We successfully integrated Checked C into an existing
legacy C ecosystem and started converting RIOT incre-
mentally from legacy C to Checked C. Even though not
originally intended by the Checked C developers, it is also
possible to retain compatibility with existing legacy C se-
tups by making Checked C features optional through C
preprocessor macros. This makes it possible to sustain sup-
port for IoT devices which are too constrained for runtime
overow checks. This was especially worthwhile since the
executable size overhead indicated by our benchmarks was
higher than expected.
We consider Checked C a promising technique for im-
proving the security of existing legacy C software used on
constrained devices. Nonetheless, we didn’t propose inte-
grating our changes to RIOT developers because Checked
C itself is still a moving target and the compiler is currently
“not recommended for production use” [3]. However, this
can also be seen as an advantage as it allows the Checked
C developers to address some of the issues laid out in this
paper.
One of those issues is missing tooling support for
bounds-safe interfaces [28]. Future work should thus fo-
cus on improving tooling for bounds-safe interfaces and
our macro system. In this regard it might be worth-
while to evaluate whether some of the issues we had with
our macro system can be circumvented by writing vanilla
Checked C instead and converting it to legacy C using
a custom C preprocessor. Additionally, future research
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should focus on further reducing the executable size over-
head we observed in order to also support highly con-
strained IoT devices.
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